Introduction
Africa. Who are you?
I deliberately don't say here, "What are you?" As we know, the interrogative pronoun "what" is an attempt to grab the essence of something. As Heidegger says: "whatness [Wassein] , comprises what one commonly calls… the idea or mental representation by means of which we propose to… grasp what a thing is." 1 As such, questions starting with the interrogative pronoun "what" are eminently violent because they reduce the object of inquiry to a thing that can be held in one's hand; that can make sense as a totality; that can be conceptualized with one idea. The history of philosophy-from Plato 2 to Augustine, 3 from Descartes 4 to Lenin, 5 all the way to Kwame Nkrumah, 6 for example-is littered with the question "What…?"; with these violent attempts at grabbing the essence of something. 7 Africa's history is also littered with these attempts at reducing a continent to an essence or concept. These attempts are absurdly grandiose (pinning down "the idea" of Africa, for example 8 ) and ridiculously small (analyzing the minutiae of life in a village, for example 9 ). In all cases, they try to envision Africa as an object to be possessed by any means and I know that we can't carry on doing that. So I repeat once more, Africa, who are you 10 ? I realize that using the interrogative pronoun "who" for what is usually understood as a geographical landmass is rather odd. One does not ask a continent who they are. The reason I am asking "who" rather than "what" is because I want to evade a more specific problem. The problem is that the question "What?" usually hides a very conventional understanding of time, the singular time of the author. This problem is not unique to African Studies; it permeates most fields in the humanities and social sciences. However, I think it is most salient in the field of African Studies because Africa has so often been the object of anthropological and ethnological investigations, and that, as Johannes Fabian's famous book Time and the Other has taught us, these investigations always posit two times: the time of the ethnographer and the time of the object investigated, namely, here, Africa. 11 In what follows, my aim is not to repeat Fabian's well-known argument, but to excavate this much more constitutive problem of the time of the ethnographer or of any other "grapher" (a philosopher, for example) who speaks or writes about Africa or African philosophy.
You could no doubt ask: does it matter? Why should we explore the time of the author asking the question "What?" Isn't what counts what the author says and not his or her apperception of time? This is why evading the interrogative pronoun "What?" is crucial. My argument is that asking the question "What?" (objectively 12 or subjectively 13 ) necessarily always posits the time of the author as abstract, intuited, and hidden. This hidden time is, of course, that of thought. It is not the present or a stand in for presence because thought exceeds the confines of the "here and now," dragging in the past (the reason for the question) and the future (the anticipation of an answer). It is a much more complex time that stretches out in all directions with the author's "I think" at its core. He or she is indeed always there, alone, in the fullness of this abstract and intuited time without needing justification to be able to ask: "What is there?"/"What am I?" The question "What?" not only objectifies and essentializes what is put under scrutiny, it also consolidates the thinking author in its hidden temporal confines. Why is this always the case? Why do scholarly writing so often hide under an abstract and intuited time and can there be another way of going about it?
You could also ask: but isn't my question "Who are you, Africa?" not also positing an abstract apperception of time? The answer is "no" because the interrogative pronoun "Who?"-unlike "What?"-necessarily calls for dialogue and therefore for at least two times: the other's and mine. "Who?" concerns not the fixing of the representation of a thing, but the possibility of an interlocutor who could potentially respond. As such, the question "Who?" is effectively a theological and not a philosophical question. It is addressed not only to the other, but also potentially to the radically Other (in most cases, God). 14 The theological aspect of the question "Who?" is not intended to entirely discard the question "What?" or to call for a return to religious talk. The shift from philosophy to theology is an attempt, on the one hand, to insist on the importance of treating Africa as a subject and not as an object and on the other, to posit the possibility of another time, and therefore of another kind of conversation.
By evading the question "What?" and insisting on the theological question "Who?" instead, my aim is to question what I call the mono-logic that always structures all thoughts in the humanities and in what concerns us here African Studies. As its name implies, a mono-logic refers to a singular logic. 15 This logic is the one that equates time in general with an "I think" asking the question "What?" In other words, a mono-logic equates time with the cogito and therefore with logos. 16 This equation is as old as philosophy: 17 it can be found, for example, in Aristotle who famously says that, "it is impossible for there to be time if there is no mind…" 18 clearly emphasizing the equivalence of the two. Hegel also insists that "time is the same principle as the I = I of pure self-consciousness," 19 thus leaving time with no room to being anything else. Even the early Heidegger asserts authoritatively that: "time and the 'I think' are no longer opposed to one another as unlike and incompatible; they are the same." 20 These random examples do no mean that no philosopher ever attempted to debunk the hegemony of this stringent mono-logic. Emmanuel Levinas' attempt, for example, to re-inscribe the radically Other in the cogito's "I am" 21 only displaces the problem without resolving it. The "fearful face-to-face that takes place without mediation" 22 that Levinas speaks off, clearly shatters the sealed aspect of the cogito, finally giving us a glimpse of a time ("hers" 23 ) that, at last, isn't "his." However, while it gives the radically Other the possibility of playing its part in the constitution of time, it still rests on an inter-subjective relation with the cogito playing a crucial part: the perfect equal of time. 24 By focusing on the unflinching equation time = cogito, my aim is neither to resurrect the cogito, like Slavoj Žižek 25 nor to confirm its universality. I realize, for example, that there might not be such a thing as a cogito in Africa because many African languages evade the subject-verb-object structure of Germanic and Latin languages, including English. 26 While this is true, it does not necessarily follow that the temporality of a self-positing subject asking the question of philosophy-however it is grammatically constructed-does not remain an abstract, intuited and hidden time. This does not universalize the cogito. This simply emphasizes the universality of this abstract, intuited, and hidden time as the most common understanding of time for a subject positing itself in language and asking: "What?" It is as if the entire history of thought has been authorized by the extraordinary right of the equation: abstract, intuited, and hidden time = cogito. The question is therefore this: how is one to conceive an approach to time that is not entirely dictated by this mono-logic, this equation that monopolizes all scholarly endeavors?
The reason I think it is important to raise this question in the context of this conference/publication is because, for me, a mono-logical thought is, as Grant Farred asked us to reflect upon, the limit at which all thought on Africa begins and ends. Farred's question for this conference was indeed "Why not think/propose the limit? Why not make the limit a constitutive element when thinking Africa and African philosophy? What thinking might thinking the limit provoke, make possible, compel even?" 27 My attempt, in what follows, is to say, firstly, that all thinking of the limit is necessarily mono-logical because in order to constitute or erase a limit, it is necessary to equate the "I think" who envisages this limit with an intuited abstract time detached from this very limit. And secondly, to ask in return: if this equation is true, then is it at all possible to think a type of limit that isn't mono-logical? This is not an attempt to dismiss Farred's formidable question. On the contrary, this is an attempt to be as faithful as possible to the question and say: without a new thinking of the time from which one asks questions, no new mode of thinking on the limits of Africa or its philosophy is possible and this new thinking starts from the premise of the question: Africa, who are you? A question that, unlike "What?", invites, as I will try to show, a radically new relationship to time.
A word of warning before I begin: this is only a personal philosophical reflection. I am neither an Africanist nor a specialist in African philosophy or history. My knowledge of Africa is limited to the great lake region and specific African thinkers more or less within a Francophone remit. As such, my specialization is quite narrow. In this way, what follows restricts itself to a number of traditions taken from a small part of the continent and not from its many and diverse diasporas. Furthermore, although this essay starts with a wildly ambitious and generic first question about Africa, it does not pretend to situate itself within the context of African philosophy or to speak on behalf of African philosophers. This essay is effectively written as the continuation of a thought on time I began over fifteen years ago with my first book on the idea of the future outside of all predictions, and that I continued with two further publications, the one on Rwanda and the one on the spatial and temporal dimension of masculinity, The End of Man. 28 This reflection has reached a new stage, one which, as I hope I will demonstrate, prevents the possibility of thinking time from a mono-logical perspective. This personal stage coincides with another text, which should ideally be read in parallel with this paper, called "Time Unshackled" for the journal New Formations (forthcoming, 2016).
Poly-Logics
There is perhaps one way of conceiving an approach to time that is not entirely dictated by a mono-logic and therefore by the equation cogito = time. This approach is discretely put forward by two totally unrelated African philosophers: the late Rwandan Octave Ugirashebuja 29 and the Ivorian Bourahima Ouattara. I will only focus on the latter for two reasons: firstly, for lack of space and secondly because Ouattara's argument situates itself in a much larger reflection on the conditions of possibility for thought at the pale of philosophy. There is unfortunately no space here for me to present Bourahima Ouattara, let alone do justice to his remarkable work. 30 I have dedicated an essay to his work in a special issue edited by Pierre-Philippe Fraiture for the International Journal of Francophone Studies and I cannot therefore replicate here the arguments put forward in it. 31 I will, however, highlight the following crucial aspects of his work in what concerns me here: the overcoming of the equation time = cogito and mono-logical thinking.
Bourahima Ouattara is a prolific philosopher who has already written seven books of philosophy, a novel, and a number of essays in the field of literary criticism. 32 In what concerns me here, one of the most striking aspects of his work is that he always writes at the juncture between philosophy and ethnography. This juncture does not concern itself with disciplines or rigid institutional discourses. His aim is to devise a type of thought that is both truthful to his being and, if possible, free of concepts. To devise this type of thought, he comes up with what he calls an ethnothought, which should obviously not be confused with an ethnophilosophy. 33 Contrary to an ethnophilosophy which necessarily takes the premise of Western and therefore Greek philosophy for granted, an ethno-thought starts from the premise of the death of philosophy and from the birth of one's own ethnos, which does not refer to one's own family, tribe, nation, or racial affiliation, but to the way, one apprehends oneself in timespace. In this way, Ouattara writes not at the intersection of rigid disciplines, but at a crossroad of practices, right where and when language articulates his world and allows him to depart from it. 34 In an essay on the ethnological aspects of African ontology published in 2000 for the Cahiers d'études africaines, Ouattara confirms John Mbiti's view 35 that African thought largely evades metric or measured representations of time. 36 However, unlike Mbiti, his aim is not to support old or dubious ethnographic findings or to excavate some imaginary pre-colonial interpretation of being in relation to time. His aim is to devise a type of thought that would be representative of Africa in as much as its temporal structures evade all forms of measurements and therefore, as I will try to show, the equation cogito = time. He writes in a seemingly cryptic, but in fact formidable passage:
At the intersection of philosophy and ethnology, it is necessary not only to disarticulate chronological time, but also to de-center space in order to reveal its originary ontological coordination. This coordination shows that space is always the place of a dwelling that allows gods to visit mortals. This dwelling does not allow for any form of scientific archeo-logy that would be made with instrumental or utilitarian aims in sight. It calls instead for an ontological letting-be of four elements (gods/sky/earth/mortals). This does not put forward the kind of atomism that can be found in mechanical materialist thought. This work of disarticulation, on the contrary, invigorates and deepens the aims of an ethnology based on a post-philosophical thought. 37 What is one to make of this statement? There is no doubt that Ouattara is largely influenced by the thought of Heidegger from after the turning (die Kehre). 38 References to concepts such as "dwelling," "letting-be," and "gods/sky/earth/mortals" will sound familiar to most Heideggerian scholars. 39 However, these references should be understood within the context of his views on Africa. In a book called Penser l'Afrique suivi de l'Afrique "Fragmentée" Ouattara puts forward the idea of thinking Africa in its facticity, that is, in the way it creates and produces itself aside from all forms of conceptualization (colonial or post-colonial). 40 For that, he needs to think what it means to expose a fact of existence without automatically staining "it" with concepts: subjectivities, identities, histories, geographies, political, social, ethnic, or cultural contexts, etc. 41 This attempt to think at the edge of concepts does not mean that he blatantly ignores what makes Africa what it "is" or what constitutes the ontical realities of African's daily lives. His work of fiction clearly attests to that. 42 His aim is on the contrary to think what structures the facticity that underlines his own ethnos: temporarily being a Heideggerian Ivorian philosopher living in Basel-with all the contradictions that this entails.
With this aim, Ouattara has no other choice, but to perceive himself at once within a post-philosophical order and therefore in a sphere where the question "what?" no longer has a strong hold. As such, his apperception of time-space 43 necessarily takes place at the cusp of theology ("Who?") without entrenching this theology, as I will show, in any religiosity or spirituality. At this cusp, Ouattara articulates time-space, following Heidegger, as dwelling. 44 Dwelling does not mean living in a house or in a region of earth and surrounding ourselves with familiar objects and call it home. Dwelling means initiating one's own nature, our being capable of death as death. In other words, dwelling means setting ourselves into our own presencing and, in the process, originate time-space. Now it would be wrong to imagine this dwelling as yet another hidden mono-logical point: the "dwelling fact" of existence structuring us behind the cumbersomeness of our lives, for example. Ouattara writes from the premise of the death of philosophy and therefore from the demise of all forms of ontologies, including the device known as Dasein. Hence the unusual reference to gods visiting mortals and the fourfold.
The reason Ouattara mentions the fourfold (with its gods) in passing is because in a post-philosophical context, dwelling cannot be the only dimension that structures time-space. Dwelling is only one dimension amongst four. Mortals dwell, but this undeniable fact is not the only thing that constitutes time-space. Alongside mortals setting themselves into their own presence, sky, earth, and gods also inhabit and create time-space. Together they form the fourfold. Together they create time-space. The aconceptuality of time-space thus become much more difficult to describe because it is no longer a mono-logical affair structured by a lonesome hypostasis at its core: the cogito. It involves other dimensions that come to disturb this mono-logic. This is not an easy thought because with the fourfold, it is necessary to think time-space as the combination of more than two dimensions crisscrossing each other without a singular perspective (the "I think"/"I am") looking back and forth, ahead and behind.
Consequently, this fourfold should not be understood as a set of cardinal points or anything that could stand for a spatial or geographical metaphor. Let's take the first two in Ouattara's reference by going back to Heidegger words: "The Earth is the serving bearer… The sky is the vaulting path of the sun." 45 The earth is not the soil on planet earth, but that from which mortals dwell. In this way, the earth does not stand for the continent called "Africa" or "Europe," for example. The earth stands for the serving bearer that gives us the "idea of Africa." This serving bearer can be anything associated with that name: from a clay object to an economic statistic, basically, anything from which to cultivate ideas or concepts while mortals set themselves into presencing. By contrast, the sky stands for everything into which mortals dwell. This refers neither the atmosphere nor the outer space seen from earth, but the space 46 The sky is therefore the space into which "the idea of Africa" acquires meaning, whether laboring the earth or writing about it. Overall, it is under the sky and on earth that mortals dwell, that is, it is there, in between the two, 47 that they initiate their own nature-their being capable of death as death.
Inevitably, the big question is why on earth and under the sky should there be gods visiting mortals? Why gods and not God? This is the trickiest of references because it is so loaded with spiritual, mystical, religious and metaphysical connotations. Gods in both Ouattara and Heidegger's minds have nothing to do with any religious expression or representation, not even those who deny all forms of representations as in Islam. 48 The word "gods" in the plural does not refer to a deity in the conventional sense of the term. As one dimension of the fourfold, the gods stand for the manifold 49 emergence of what is unexpected or unusual in mortals' living present. 50 As futurities, the gods alter mortals' access to presence, by bringing in what is new and as such can never be described as something "pre-given." 51 As Reiner Schürmann rightly says, they designate "the sudden irruption in which a constellation of presence and absence situates everything anew." 52 In this way, they do not stand for the infinite, the radically other, the almighty, the creator, the star-maker, the holy ghost or any other entity, not even Spirit, this intertwinement of human and divine agency as in Hegel. Nothing can characterize them because through their disruptions, they come with the Word, as the fourfold emerges and this, without any promises of redemption or salvation and without any eschatological or messianic signs.
In this way, there can be nothing tralatitious about these gods simply because they can never perdure over time and in doing so create religions or spiritual movements. There is no "moment" when suddenly the Word appears, God speaks, and then "another moment" when His Word needs to be repeated because with the gods, there is no distinction between the Verb, 53 its advent, or its repetition. In other words, there isn't first the Word and then the possibility of semantic conflict, wars and genocides. There is the happenstance of the fourfold which is nothing other than the event of the Word and therefore of war, right when it takes place and right when peace is concluded. 54 In this way, the gods have no moral compass, and they come with no Torah, Bible, or Koran. They work only to disrupt unexpectedly the fourfold and mortals need to deal with these disruptions, not on their own, but as part of the fourfold, alongside earth and sky. 55 The gods-another difficult thought-effectively manifest themselves in the dependency of the fourfold, that is, in the dependency of mortals, sky and earth. There would be no gods without the fourfold, that is, without the emergence of the Word, any event whatsoever. 56 This mutual independency within the fourfold is crucial: we get the surprises that the fourfold deserves, including tsunamis and wars. 57 With this passing reference, Ouattara points at the possibility of finally getting ourselves out of the strict equation time = cogito that has plagued philosophy since immemorial times. With the fourfold, we leave behind the narrow confines of our relationship with time-space and accede to a fourfold spatio-temporal order in which neither "I think" nor "I am" is central. Downgraded (and not discarded, as in Quentin Meillassoux, for example 58 ) from its imperious position, the cogito suddenly needs to accommodate itself with the "whereunto" and the "why" of the other folds: earth, sky, and gods. The gods are neither the cause nor the end of mortals' happenstance, and yet they cannot take place without them. Inversely, we, as mortals, are neither the creators nor the inventors of gods and yet we cannot dwell without them. Earth and sky render vain all our attempts at elevation and yet we would not elevate ourselves without them. The poly-logic inherent in the fourfold dislocates, as Ouattara says, our long-held ontical interpretations of time-space, forcing us to accept that the mono-logic under which we operate is nothing but one of four that arises non-simultaneously, the uniqueness of the event of being, the factuality of history in which man plays, but only a small part. 59 By quadrupling the poles of reference, Ouattara, in the wake of Heidegger, ends up debunking all foundations and principles and the entire arsenal of archic and telic spatial and temporal representations. With this discrete hint of the fourfold in a text on African ethnologies, Ouattara basically manages to remove time-space from our commonplace mono-logic epochal stamping and hands it over to a poly-logic situation in which the cogito is, at last, no longer the sole player. Now it would be wrong to imagine Ouattara's interpretation of timespace as if following some twisted or perverted logic: applying hyperabstract ideas borrowed from an elderly ex-Nazi-sympathizer onto his own being and by extension, African thought. In a way, one could argue that nothing could be further from anything relating to Africa. But Ouattara's aim is neither to pitch one institution against another (Greek/African philosophy) nor to invent some tenuous link between the ethnographies and philosophies of the Ivory Coast and those of Germany. His aim is to think "the philosophical-ethnological status of thought," 60 that is, a type of thought that is finally unencumbered by the gravitational forces of monology, forces that always bring everything down to the subject understood as object stuck in a single time with a past and a future. This is a difficult thought because it does not allow one to dwell on any folkloric aspect of our own ethnos, i.e. the idiosyncrasies of the places and/or times from which we hail. The aim is to think the happenstance of our Be-ing at its place of dwelling, that is, as it enters into presencing, as it deals with the fourfold with its unruly, but dependent gods.
To make such a bold claim is not to suggest that, from now on, we should return to polytheism and believe in gods or that we should try to reinvent faith in the hope of finding where gods are lurking. Whether monotheist or polytheist, to "believe" or "seek out" is to posit the divine or divinities as existing independently of mortals. But this is not the case with either Ouattara or Heidegger. Gods and mortals are united in their codependency between earth and sky. In this way, if we follow Ouattara's thought, then the aim is therefore two-fold: on the one hand, we can no longer think in one time only: the cogito needs to deal with more than just the time that structures it; it needs to deal with other dimensions, some of which are out of its control or jurisdiction. On the other hand, this thought allows us to see that the only way out of the constitutive problem we face everyday in our capitalist world-the fact that the present is never present enough, a problem that contemporary philosophy is at the moment unable to overcome 61 -can only be resolved by radically multiplying and increasing the depths that we give to the future, here named gods. 62 The gods are futurities, here understood not as a singular horizon of possibility, but as a firmament of untimeliness, the very tangible marks of what can never be guessed, what can never give us a return in this life. Isn't this precisely what capitalism abhors above all else?
Africa
So here I am addressing myself to you, Africa. 63 The "I" that addresses you and signs this essay counts for little.
Firstly, I do not stand high and mighty outside of the semantic economy of language, dictating the view from an imaginary site of eternal presence or from a universal "elsewhere" detached from the vagaries and idiosyncrasies of my mortal body. I have also avoided using an impersonal and passive voice in order to emphasize a supposed impartiality, objectivity, or detached subjectivity. My words engage the semantic economy of language from a specific place in time-space and from the peculiarities of an ever-changing body that knows it is dying, but this economy is not the only one that makes time-space. Another economy, a much more subtle and complex economyone that defies all economies as trade or bartering-also structures this language that is now, more than ever, never really mine. 64 Earth, sky, and gods also play their part in this economy. The semantic economy of language would not exist without this continually disregarded fourfold economy that sunders its associated mono-logical time-space into a plurality of time-spaces.
Secondly, I do not stand as the agency through which time-space take place. My finitude isn't the only thing that can reveal and paradoxically also evade the in-finity 65 of time-space. No capitalized word, in Greek or in any other language, embodies alone such event. Furthermore, my proper name does not hypostasize this event-even if conceived on the edge of property or properness 66 -with a date of birth and an indeterminate date of death on the horizon, channeling on the way im-memorial pasts and un-foreseeable futures. Past and future are made up of other dimensions-earth, sky, gods-that exceed my finitude, including the future ephemeral engraving on my tombstone. In this way, my finitude is just one dimension of a fourfold whose other dimensions exceed me and point in the direction of a beyond "me," a divine "beyond" where I no longer matter, where none of this (African studies, philosophy, the world, the earth), no longer matters.
Once more, here I am addressing myself to you, Africa. The "you" of this address arises out of a depth without measure.
Firstly, this "you" or this "Africa" comes neither from a mysterious place of learning nor from direct observation. In other words, you neither stems from the hallowed spaces of libraries (SOAS in London, for example) nor from the intricacies of lived experienced (my colleagues in the University town of Butare in Rwanda, for example). You come from a place that paradoxically allows itself to be apprehended and exploited and yet exceeds all attempts to harness or master. You, Africa, rise before me from an impenetrable in-finity made up of questionable inventions, dubious ideas, dangerous parallels and analogies (pre-colonial, colonial, or postcolonial) and of a depth that defies all understanding of depth. The earth from which you hail, this earth that allows you to inspire and agitate us into action and writing, can only indeed shatter all scientific knowledge, past, present, and future, including the proceedings of this very scholarly undertaking. The earth is no substantial ground, but a withdrawal of ground. 67 If this weren't the case, Africa would have never been able to rise in our consciousness in the way you do here. Secondly, this "you" does not stem from a specific continent, not even the one that bears your name. While there is no doubt that, as Mudimbe says, "there are natural features, cultural characteristics, and, probably, values that contribute to the reality of Africa as a continent and its civilization as constituting a totality" 68 worth addressing, these features, characteristics, and values are not exactly what make you stand here before us. This earth, out of which you grew, was made by Grant Farred, Gerard Aching and Kasereka Kavwahirehi. No, they are not the fathers of Africa, but they are the ones who conjured up the ferment that allowed the addressee of this paper to rise up before us, mortals. Their efforts were not just practical, organizational, or developmental (stemming from the previous conference that took place at Rhodes University, for example). Their efforts exceed such simple causalities and effects. The "you" or the "Africa" that emerges here in these pages rose because of their mortal thinking bodies involved in other earths, skies and gods. Without their own fourfolds, without this unfathomable and diverse ferment out of which you grew, I could not have addressed you.
And again, here I am addressing myself to you, Africa. This "you" elevates itself beyond this aggregate of living subjectivities that makes Africa what it is.
Firstly, this "you" or this "Africa" does not elevate itself into an academic or scholarly setting, the kind of setting-spoken or written-in which scholars ponder the meaning of Africa, its limits or ends. This does not mean that there is no event called "you" or "African Thinking: And/At its Limits." This simply means that a lot more is at stake when it comes to the way this addressee manifests itself as Africa. Firstly, "you" is both singular (the second person singular, Africa) and plural (the second person plural, the many significations and/or manifestations attached to the word Africa). This undecided character necessarily sets this addressee or denomination apart, not into an "elsewhere," but at a limit where the semantic unity is unstable: at once singular and multiple. We all have both one strict idea of who you are and a multiplicity of conflicting opinions about you. As such, when addressed, this "you" or Africa elevates itself into a realm on the edge of all discursive formations whether oral or written; a realm for which the sky is the limit. And this limit is changeable, always prone to inhospitable weather. In this way, the sky into which "you" or Africa appears is therefore structured by much more than what we can think, do, or say, at conferences, in academic journals, or anywhere else on earth; a "much more" without which none of this could take place.
Secondly, this "you" or this "Africa" does not emerge as a fact or object obediently setting itself up to be probed, dissected, analyzed, and discarded. The very fact that you happen, that scholars address you, does not mean that you raise yourself solely to be placed, submissive and docile, under the scrutiny of scientific enquiries. Because you are above all, as previously mentioned, a subject or a plurality of subjects, you are effectively limit-less, a finite and yet infinite offering. This does not mean you are a gift created, produced, or manufactured for study, action, or entertainment. This means instead that, as subject(s), you are an offering that defies all forms of biological or logical creation, production, or manufacture. Insubordinate, rebellious, the other of the upright concept, 69 you are an offering that never ceases to frustrate anyone who approaches you. Your defiance knows no bounds. The ungraspable expanse of the sky into which you elevate yourself therefore also plays its part and mortals need to hear this unruly in-finity if they want to do right by you. Without the boundlessness of the sky into which you emerge for consideration, I-or anyone else-could not even begin to address you.
And finally, one last time, here I am addressing myself to you, Africa. In this sentence, the subject ("I"), the verb ("addressing") and the addressee ("you" or "Africa") don't just come together because of an "I think." Firstly, the sentence "I am addressing myself to you, Africa" does not just constitute an event between mortals. It is not simply a response to a call for papers. If it were, then it would simply be discussed for a while-the time of a conference, the time of a peer-reviewed journal-and then discarded, the typical mortal destiny of all addresses, whether oral or written. To reduce this address to such an inevitable destiny-even if it is understood as destinerrance, i.e. an errancy outside the control of the addressor 70 -is to demote it to the status of object: a paper, an essay. To say "I am addressing myself to you" is in fact to create an event that also involves utterly dependent, but unfathomable gods. Again, mention of these gods does not intend to create a new religion, but to give figure to how the future manifests itself: in this case, your volatile responses, your unpredictable thinking or questioning, i.e. all these monstrous disruptions to the event of this address. In this way, it is not only in your hands that I am leaving this message; it is also in the hands of these unruly and yet dependent gods. Without these gods, without these responses that make who you are, this address would not have taken place. Secondly, the event "I am addressing myself to you, Africa" is not just an ethical response to a problem of limits-the limits of African thought, for example. Strictly speaking, this address neither inscribes itself solely within a set of normative ethics (polite codes, scholarly etiquette, academic good conduct, contractual arrangements, etc.) nor within an understanding of ethics that involves the radically Other, a type of responsibility before all forms of morality. If this were the case, then this address would inscribe itself within the context of a tradable morality: either with society (an economic covenant) or with God (a religious or spiritual covenant). Because dependent gods are involved, this address sets itself instead in a plurality of responses that can never be pinned down with laws, codes, or precepts. The earth gives rise to it. The sky allows it to take place. Mortals give it significance. Gods disrupt it. This fourfold approach does not free the addressor of ethical or moral duties. The fourfold constrains him or her to think their ethical responses as one amongst other responses originating in other dimensions, including earth, sky, and gods. These other responses might not necessarily be ethical. Other dimensions' responses might well jeopardize all chances of lawfulness and salvation.
I started this paper with the improper question "Africa, who are you?" By asking the question "who" instead of "what" my aim was to question the recurrent mono-logic that always informs most scholarly addresses, including those put forward in African Studies and, more broadly, philosophy in general. Through such questioning, I hope to have shown that it is not quite possible to reduce either the "I think" and/or the "I am" to time as such. Other dimensions inflect and deflect, distort and reassemble this cogito without allowing it to either reconfigure it as the twin of time or merge it with time to the point of being utterly undifferentiated. This is what Ouattara's radical destabilization of time-space allowed us to see and put to the test. The present paper only hints at the possibilities of not making time and the "I think"/"I am" the sole organizing structure. Much more will need to be said and written in order to continue debunking this simple myth that time and the cogito are either one or unrelated.
Beyond the present figuration, Africa will obviously not respond. I have neither plundered the Colonial Library nor raided post-colonial theory in order to express a fictional or scholarly response. I have been economical in my use of African or Western philosophy in order to provide a more or less meaningful response to the conference/publication's call. But even through this use, I have also not imagined a dialogue between "you" and me. Like Ouattara, I have simply engaged with the question of this conference/publication in a way that reveals my ethno-thought. Again, this does not mean I engage either the science of ethnology or the discipline of philosophy. This simply means that I operated from a post-philosophical perspective that neither betrays my background nor makes assumptions about the other. This ethno-thought took place because earth, sky, and gods were also involved. Together, the fourfold rang. 71 Out of this ringing, Africa made itself faintly heard in the distance, not as a sum of historical, geographical, cultural, or societal accounts that can be validated or verified, evaluated or even judged in any of the ontic sciences, but as potential subject(s) perverting all these ontical determinations and calculations.
This ringing hints at the fact that no thinking of a limit to Africa or African philosophy is possible. Free from the dictatorship of mono-logical referents, the limit ceases to be conceivable even as an invaginated 72 topology where the demarcation between an "over here" and an "over there" has been blurred to the point of being utterly unrecognizable. It also ceases to be conceivable as a provocation, the urgency of the call of that which is to come. Africa or African philosophy can have neither one limit nor a multiplicity of limits not because it can never be conceived as an object of representation, but because it knows no proper ground or enclosed sky and because no mortal is able to enunciate it without these gods that pervert the very consolidation of its happenstance. Thus freed, what we call a continent of earth, what we determine as having specific cultural and societal values and for good or bad, a few ethnological referents, can no longer gather into one. From now on, you or Africa can only disperse into a poly-logical fourfold doing for which mortals' letting-be 73 is its absolute precondition. Indeed, without letting be of the "I think"/time (and thereby of all mono-logical thinking), we will not be able to hear 74 how we dwell alongside earth, sky and gods. To hear the poly-logic of the fourfold, to hear how we dwell, we really need to start learning to be mortal and invent a new post-philosophical language.
